When Political Fronts Multiply, Who Gains?

Millat Times Desk

15 November 2026 (Publish: 08:00 AM IST)

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The new AIMIM-Azad alliance, political realignments and the arithmetic of power in Uttar Pradesh

By M. Burhanuddin Qasmi

Indian politics has a long history of leaders and parties switching alliances. Late Ram Vilas Paswan, a prominent Dalit leader who also enjoyed support among Muslim voters, moved from the NDA to the UPA in 2004 before returning to the NDA in 2014. Nitish Kumar left the NDA in 2013, returned in 2017, joined the opposition again in 2022 and rejoined the NDA in January 2024. Chandrababu Naidu’s Telugu Desam Party left the NDA in 2018 and returned in 2024. In Maharashtra, the late Ajit Pawar, then a senior leader of the undivided NCP, joined the BJP-led government in July 2023. The NCP had been a constituent of the UPA, and Ajit Pawar had served in Maharashtra’s Congress-NCP coalition government. Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, meanwhile, was once a prominent Congress leader who enjoyed support among sections of Muslim voters but is now a leading BJP politician.

These political journeys show how alliances can change, even when leaders are elected on mandates shaped by entirely different political coalitions. Many prominent Muslim politicians and parties would, of course, join the BJP-led NDA if the BJP were willing to welcome them. However, the BJP’s political arithmetic does not appear to favour bringing Muslims (read: Abduls) into its fold. Doing so could undermine its long-cultivated polarising rhetoric and jeopardise its anti-Congress vote base. Its short-lived alliance with Mehbooba Mufti in Jammu and Kashmir was an exception, driven by strategic considerations. The BJP withdrew support from her government in 2018, and the BJP-led Union government subsequently detained her in 2019.

The record of AIMIM’s former allies is equally relevant. In the 2020 Bihar Assembly election, Upendra Kushwaha’s Rashtriya Lok Samata Party (RLSP), Mayawati’s BSP, Om Prakash Rajbhar’s Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party (SBSP), AIMIM and two other parties formed the Grand Democratic Secular Front. In Uttar Pradesh, Rajbhar’s SBSP was also part of the Bhagidari Sankalp Morcha, which included AIMIM, ahead of the 2022 Assembly election.

Rajbhar joined the BJP-led NDA in July 2023, while Kushwaha’s RLSP merged with the JD(U) in 2021. Kushwaha later left the JD(U), formed his own party and allied with the NDA. These short-lived alliances ultimately worked against the UPA, now part of the INDIA bloc, and favoured the NDA in electoral terms. Such precedents are relevant when assessing political consistency and the consequences of changing alliances.

Against this background, Asaduddin Owaisi’s AIMIM and Chandrashekhar Azad’s Azad Samaj Party (Kanshiram) have once again announced the Samajik Parivartan Morcha for the 2027 Uttar Pradesh Assembly election. The two leaders say the alliance will contest all 403 seats, with Azad as its chief ministerial candidate. Both describe it as a platform for Dalits, Muslims, backward classes and other marginalised communities. That stated objective deserves consideration, as does the electoral impact of fielding candidates across a state where opposition votes are already divided.

Uttar Pradesh elections are decided constituency by constituency, and many contests are settled by narrow margins. Even a modest shift in votes can change the outcome. If the new front draws most of its support from voters who would otherwise back the INDIA bloc, while making little inroad into the NDA’s vote base, the BJP-led alliance could benefit from the fragmentation of opposition votes. This is the central electoral concern raised by critics of the front. How many votes will it attract, and from where? How many Assembly seats can it win, and what influence will its MLAs have?

Chandrashekhar Azad is an emerging, self-made Dalit leader whose rise has coincided with the decline of the BSP’s earlier dominance among sections of Dalit voters. His right to seek office is not in question. But Owaisi’s recent assertion that “Abdul” will no longer fix punctures or lay carpets for political leaders but will become a leader himself raises a practical question: if the larger objective is to make “Abdul” a leader, why should Azad automatically be the preferred choice for Abdul as chief minister?

Akhilesh Yadav has already served as chief minister and leads an established state-wide party. The Congress, too, represents a nationally recognised political formation, although its organisational strength in Uttar Pradesh is considerably weaker. Voters may reasonably ask what administrative experience, legislative strength and coalition support underpin the new alliance’s claim to power. Announcing a chief ministerial candidate before an election is not the same as demonstrating the ability to command a majority afterwards.

In the 2022 Uttar Pradesh Assembly election, AIMIM and Azad Samaj Party fielded 95 and 110 candidates, respectively. Between them, they contested 205 seats but failed to win a single one. Their presence, however, affected several electoral contests.

This distinction matters because representation and governance are not the same. A state is governed by the party or coalition that commands a majority in its elected Assembly. Budgets, laws and major policy decisions are made through the legislature. One, two or even a handful of legislators cannot ordinarily implement a political programme independently. Their influence depends on numbers, alliances and negotiating strength. A party may attract votes and gain visibility but remain far from directing a government.

Marginalised communities in Uttar Pradesh, including Muslims, are looking for legislative power, not merely a handful of token MLAs.

The question, therefore, is not whether smaller parties have the democratic right to contest elections. They do. The question is whether their strategy strengthens the representation they promise or fragments an existing electoral coalition without creating a viable alternative capable of delivering pro-poor policies and legislation.

Fragmentation may create opportunities for individual politicians and parties, but its consequences will be reflected in the composition of the next Assembly and the government it produces. The interests of Dalits, Muslims and other marginalised citizens require more than slogans or symbolic claims. They require durable representation, legislative influence and accountable governance.

Voters must therefore assess every alliance not only by the promises made at its launch but also by the electoral arithmetic it creates and the governing power it can realistically exercise.

(The author is editor, Eastern Crescent, Mumbai)